The Elusive Aim of Universal Suffrage: Constitutional Developments in Hong Kong by Langer, Lorenz
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2007
The Elusive Aim of Universal Suffrage: Constitutional Developments in
Hong Kong
Langer, Lorenz
Abstract: Unspecified
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom018
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-99893
Originally published at:
Langer, Lorenz (2007). The Elusive Aim of Universal Suffrage: Constitutional Developments in Hong
Kong. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5(3):419-452. DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom018
© The Author 2007. Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
I•CON, Volume 5, Number 3, 2007, pp. 419–452 doi:10.1093/icon/mom018
419
 ARTICLE  
 The elusive aim of universal suffrage: 
Constitutional developments in 
Hong Kong 
 Lorenz  Langer * 
 For most of its one hundred and ﬁ fty years, British rule over Hong Kong did not allow 
for any political participation by the local population. Prior to the territory’s return to 
China, however, the United Kingdom and the prospective new sovereign agreed that 
both the legislature and executive of the future Hong Kong would be determined by 
elections. China further speciﬁ ed that, as an  “ ultimate aim, ” these elections would 
be based on universal suffrage. Yet in the years since, China has intervened in the 
supposedly autonomous region to slow down or halt constitutional development. While 
these interventions contravene the constitutional provisions of the Special Administrative 
Region, they should not come as a surprise; nor do they represent a change in Chinese 
attitudes toward Hong Kong. Rather, they reﬂ ect the Chinese government’s misgivings 
about free elections — misgivings not unlike those of the British with respect to colonial 
Hong Kong. 
 On July 1, 2007, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will 
celebrate the tenth anniversary of its Constitution, the Basic Law, 1 which sets 
out  “ the systems and policies practiced in the HKSAR, including the social and 
economic systems, the system for safeguarding the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of its residents, the executive, legislative and judicial systems, and the 
relevant policies. ” 2 With regard to the selection of the executive and legislative 
 * Research assistant, Institute of Public International and Foreign Constitutional Law, University of Zurich, 
Ph.D. candidate. I would like to thank Teresa Kam, Juliane Kokott, Kay Hailbronner, and Lewes Leung for their 
support. Email:  Lorenz.Langer@gmx.net 
 1  Z HONGHUA R ENMIN G ONGHEGUO X IANGGANG T EBIE X INGZHENGQU  JI BEN FA (The Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China) [hereinafter  Basic Law ],  available at 
 http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/Basic_Law.pdf (last visited April 3, 2007). The 
Basic Law was promulgated on April 4, 1990, in its Chinese version, which, in cases of conﬂ ict, 
prevails over the ofﬁ cial English version adopted on June 28, 1990, by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress. On the drafting process, see Ming K. Chan,  Democracy Derailed ,  in 
T HE H ONG K ONG B ASIC L AW 1 – 35 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., Hong Kong Univ. Press 1991). 
 2  Basic Law art. 11. 
420 I•CON July 2007 Vol. 5: 419
systems, however, the Basic Law contains a promise rather than a deﬁ  nitive 
arrangement: articles 45( 2) and 68( 2) establish as an “ultimate aim” the elec-
tion of both the executive and legislature of Hong Kong “by universal suffrage.” 
Yet in 2004, only one half of the territory’s parliamentary body, the Legislative 
Council (LegCo), was directly elected by geographical constituencies, while 
thirty out of sixty seats were ﬁ lled through  “ functional constituencies ” repre-
senting various industries and professions. In March 2007, when the incum-
bent Donald Tsang was elected to another ﬁ ve-year term as chief executive — the 
head of the HKSAR and its government 3 — it was not by universal suffrage but 
by an Election Committee of 800. 
 Progress toward the eventual aim of universal suffrage has not made much 
headway in ten years and has recently come to a complete standstill. In a seem-
ingly paradoxical move, in December 2005, the prodemocracy forces in LegCo, 
which keep demanding constitutional reform, defeated proposals introduced 
by the HKSAR government to include elected district councillors in the Election 
Committee, and to enlarge LegCo. 4 
 Why, given the clear constitutional aim, has Hong Kong not progressed further 
on the road to universal suffrage since its return to China? And why, of all political 
actors, did democratic parties use LegCo, their only forum, to block any progress 
on constitutional development, perhaps for years to come? This article aims to set 
out the constitutional framework of the Special Administrative Region, and to 
retrace the constitutional debates that have been heating up in Hong Kong since 
1997. It will look at three important reasons why constitutional development has 
stalled — and is likely to remain at an impasse for considerable time to come. 
 First, the  “ parents ” of the HKSAR had differing, if not opposing, interests at 
its inception. When the United Kingdom realized that it would not be able to 
hold onto its colony, it felt obliged to secure some sort of constitutional frame-
work that would guarantee certain rights for Hong Kong and its residents. 
China, for its part, was determined to reclaim Hong Kong but recognized the 
need for a peaceful transition lest the territory lose its economic value. Thus, 
the former metropolitan power was committed to constitutional reform but 
was not in a position to ensure its implementation. The new metropolitan 
power regarded any move toward democracy as a British plot to undermine 
future Chinese rule, yet it also felt obliged to comply to some extent with British 
demands. As a compromise, a constitutional framework and a blueprint for 
democratization were agreed on that provided for an implementation of uni-
versal suffrage that would be gradual and tortuous and would occur only with 
Chinese consent. Once the return of a prosperous Hong Kong was secured, 
China has had little interest in seeing this process completed, or even initiated. 
 3  Basic Law arts. 43(1) and 48(1). 
 4  See infra note 204 and accompanying text.  “ HKSAR government ” refers to the chief executive 
and the executive authorities of the region.  Cf .  Basic Law arts. 59 and 60. 
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 Second, it is further argued that this nonchalance toward constitutional pre-
scriptions reﬂ  ects the situation in mainland China, where the written Constitution 
is of little help in determining the political and legal realities of the People’s 
Republic. China has shown signs of applying a similar ideological and political 
approach to the Basic Law, thus ignoring the document’s legal nature and its inter-
pretative provisions by the competent authorities, namely, the courts. 
 However — the third factor — the People’s Republic cannot be blamed exclu-
sively for the lack of progress in Hong Kong’s democratization. The Basic Law 
does offer some means for the authorities of the HKSAR to further constitutional 
progress. The executive, in particular, holds considerable power, although it is 
appointed by the Central People’s Government (CPG) of China, to which the 
chief executive would owe exclusive allegiance. 5 Seeing that China is opposed to 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong, the HK government has shown no will to 
advance an agenda that might invoke the displeasure of the CPG. With the Basic 
Law endowing the Hong Kong legislature and judiciary with restricted powers, 
it may be argued that the Hong Kong executive bears signiﬁ cant responsibility 
for attaining universal suffrage — or, by extension, for failing to achieve it. 
 1.  The transition from Crown Colony to Special 
Administrative Region 
 1.1 .  Laying the foundations: Hong Kong’s colonial past 
 As Britain’s most signiﬁ cant spoil of the ﬁ rst Opium War, 6 Hong Kong was 
established as a colony by Letters Patent in 1843, which also laid down the 
basic structure of its government. 7 As the representative of the Queen’s sover-
eignty over Hong Kong, the governor exercised nearly absolute power. 8 He had 
full authority to make and enact laws and ordinances, advised by the Legislative 
Council (LegCo) over which he presided and whose members he appointed. 9 In 
addition, he selected the Executive Council (ExCo)  “ to advise and assist ” him in 
the administration of government. The governor also held the powers of using 
the Public Seal, of granting land, of appointing judges and civil servants, and of 
 5  On the Central People’s Government, see  infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 6  Treaty of Nanking, UK-China, art. 3, Aug. 29, 1842, 93 Consol. T.S. 467. 
 7  Letters Patent (The Hong Kong Charter)  1843,  reprinted in G OVERNMENT  AND P OLITICS : A D OCUMEN-
TARY H ISTORY  OF H ONK K ONG 19 (Steve Tsang ed., Hong Kong Univ. Press 1995). On the Opium wars 
and the early history of Hong Kong, see I MMANUEL C.Y. H SÜ , T HE R ISE  OF M ODERN C HINA 168 – 220 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2000) and S TEVE T SANG , A M ODERN H ISTORY of HONG KONG 3 – 41 (Hong Kong 
Univ. Press 2004). The Letters Patent were supplemented by the Royal Instructions in 1843 
(G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS 22 – 30). New Letters Patent were issued in 1917, 1985, 1991 and 
1993. 
 8  N ORMAN M INERS , T HE G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS OF H ONG K ONG 69 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 9  Letters Patent (The Hong Kong Charter)  1843,  in G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS ,  supra note 7, at 19. 
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granting pardons. Thus, the administration of Hong Kong was not merely 
executive-led; originally, it consisted of little more than the executive branch. 
 Initially, both Legislative and Executive Councils consisted exclusively of ex 
ofﬁ cio members, who sat on one (or both) councils due to their position in the 
colonial administration. However, two  “ unofﬁ cial members ” were appointed 
as early as 1850, with the ﬁ rst ethnic Chinese member admitted on a perma-
nent basis in 1884. 10 A second Chinese unofﬁ cial member was added later, 
while suggestions for elected representatives were repeatedly rejected. For the 
British government, the appointment system allowed for the selection of trust-
worthy British subjects, while any electoral process might have resulted in an 
unpredictable outcome. 11 Nonetheless, after the Second World War in particu-
lar, attempts were made to introduce some form of municipal self-government, 
which, however, resulted merely in limited direct elections to the Urban Council 
with little powers. 12 Eventually, an alternative path was pursued to ensure the 
peace and prosperity of Hong Kong. In response to growing social unrest in the 
1960s, the colonial government embarked on a major welfare program with a 
public housing scheme at its core. 13 
 In most other British colonies, some form of political participation was intro-
duced gradually from the 1960s onward, usually as a ﬁ rst step on the path to 
independence. As required by the United Nations Charter, Britain did, in some 
cases,  “ develop self-government ” in its colonies,  “ assist[ing] them in the pro-
gressive development of their free political institutions. ” 14 Yet no such develop-
ment took place in Hong Kong, which remained untouched by the decolonization 
120 Lorenz movement that was sweeping so much of the world in the decades 
after World War Two. Britain did fulﬁ ll its charter obligations to report to the 
UN on Hong Kong periodically, 15 but this reporting ceased in 1972, when the 
People’s Republic requested that the territory be removed from the United Nations’ 
 10  S TEVE T SANG , D EMOCRACY S HELVED : G REAT B RITAIN , C HINA, AND A TTEMPTS AT C ONSTITUTIONAL R EFORM IN 
H ONG K ONG , 1945 – 1952 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988). 
 11  T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 28. 
 12  The Urban Council was little more than an advisory board on sanitary matters.  See T SANG ,  supra 
note 10, at 158 – 160. 
 13  Y ASH G HAI , H ONG K ONG ’s N EW C ONSTITUTIONAL O RDER 18 (Hong Kong Univ. Press 1999). In addition, 
numerous advisory bodies and consultative forums were established.  See Christine Loh,  Govern-
ment and Business Alliance: Hong Kong’s Functional Constituencies, in F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES : A 
U NIQUE F EATURE OF THE H ONG K ONG L EGISLATIVE C OUNCIL 30 (Christine Loh et al. eds., Hong Kong Univ. 
Press 2006). 
 14  UN Charter art. 73(b). Directly elected legislatures were introduced in Malaya (present-day 
Malaysia) and Singapore in the 1950s.  See L EO G OODSTADT ,  Business-friendly and Politically Convenient: 
The Historical Role of Functional Constituencies ,  in F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES ,  supra note 13, at 41. 
 15  UN Charter art. 73(e). Reports were submitted to the Special Committee on Decolonization 
established by G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Nov. 27, 1961). 
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decolonization agenda. 16 According to General Assembly Resolution 742 (VIII), 
the validity of any form of association between a non-self-governing territory 
and a metropolitan or any other country essentially depended on the freely 
expressed will of the people in the territory concerned. 17 Yet Britain saw no 
need to consult Hong Kongers over the status quo; nor would China want them 
to have a say in a possible future scenario in which the territory was recovered. 
Thus, neither country envisaged the decolonization of Hong Kong, in accord-
ance with the UN’s self-determination model, as being in their interests. 
 1.2.  Sino-British negotiations and the Joint Declaration 
 In the late 1970s, the tranquility of paternalistic colonial rule was disturbed by 
the prospect of Hong Kong’s return to China. While Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon had been acquired by Britain  “ in perpetuity, ” 18 the larger part of the 
colony (the so-called New Territories) had been leased for ninety-nine years in 
1898, and the leasehold was set to expire on July 1, 1997. 19 A ﬁ rst attempt by 
Britain to ascertain Chinese intentions for Hong Kong was made in 1979. It 
resulted in an unequivocal statement by Deng Xiaoping that China had always 
been Hong Kong’s sovereign and would recover the territory in its entirety. 20 
Yet in 1982, when Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing, the United Kingdom still 
hoped to retain control of the territory after 1997, trading sovereignty for 
administration. 21 This would have presupposed Chinese recognition of British 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. In its initial insistence on the validity of the so-
called unequal treaties, Britain failed to appreciate how extraordinarily sensi-
tive China was and still is to the issue of sovereignty; Chinese sentiments 
were — and are — strongly inﬂ uenced by its descent into semicolonialism in the 
 16  UN Department of Public Information, Trust and Non-self-governing Territories, 1945 – 1999, 
 available at  http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust2.htm (last visited April 4, 2007); 
P ETER W ESLEY -S MITH , C ONSTITUTIONAL AND A DMINISTRATIVE L AW IN H ONG K ONG 52 (Longman Asia 1994). 
 17  G.A. Res. 742 (VIII), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/2630.  See also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/4684 
(Dec. 14, 1960),  and G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, Principle VII, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 
1960). 
 18  Treaty of Nanking art. 3,  supra note 6; Convention of Friendship, U.K.-China, Oct. 24, 1860, 
123 Consol. T.S. 72 – 74. However, postimperial Chinese governments never accepted the validity 
of these  “ unequal treaties. ” On the communist doctrine of unequal treaties, see L UCIUS C AFLISH , 
 Unequal Treaties , 35 GERMAN INT’L. L.Y.B. 52 – 80 (1992). 
 19  Convention respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, U.K.-China, June 9, 1898, 186 
Consol. T.S. 310 – 311. The convention had entered into force on July 1, 1889. Even though the 
United Kingdom had not acquired ownership of the New Territories, it nevertheless claimed full 
sovereignty, arguing that the leasehold constituted a  “ cession for a term of years. ”  See W ESLEY -
 SMITH ,  supra note 16, at 27. 
 20  Governor MacLehose met Deng Xiaoping in March 1979.  See T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 212 – 216. 
 21  M ARGARET T HATCHER , T HE D OWNING S TREET Y EARS 354 – 355 (HarperCollins 1993). 
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nineteenth century. 22 Deng made it clear that recognizing British sovereignty 
over Hong Kong — even with respect to the past — was not an option; conse-
quently, China insisted on  “ recovering ” Hong Kong without qualiﬁ cation in 
1997. 23 
 Deng promised that, up to 1997 and beyond, China would have  “ an exten-
sive exchange of views with Hong Kong people from all walks of life. ” 24  “ Hong 
Kongers ruling Hong Kong ” was announced as one of China’s guiding princi-
ples in early 1982. 25 Nonetheless, when Sino-British negotiations began in the 
autumn of 1982, the Chinese insisted that they be strictly bilateral; attempts 
by Britain to include representatives of Hong Kong in an independent capacity 
were categorically rejected. When the British side tried to involve Governor 
Edward Youde, arguing that Hong Kong was a  “ stool with three legs, ” Deng 
Xiaoping maintained that there were only two legs on the stool. Any member 
of the British delegation not carrying a British passport was not permitted to 
enter the country. 26 When Chinese members of ExCo dared to express their 
critical views, Deng reprimanded them, stating that they did not represent 
Hong Kong society and that the Chinese leadership knew what was best for the 
territory. 27 
 Yet it would be wrong to attribute the exclusion of the people of Hong Kong 
solely to China. In 1979, ExCo members were kept in the dark as to Britain’s 
ﬁ rst contacts with the Chinese over Hong Kong’s future. 28 And only after 
agreement on basic principles had been reached with China did the British 
foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe disclose the results of the talks to the Hong 
Kong LegCo. 29 No procedure or framework was set up that would have allowed 
the inhabitants of Hong Kong to make their views known. When in May 
1984, unofﬁ cial members of LegCo and ExCo traveled to London to offer the 
views of the Hong Kong population (or at least of a part of it) to members of 
 22  These sentiments are illustrated by the extensive preamble to the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic, which stresses that  “ China is a country with one of the longest histories in the world, ” 
and which recounts its people’s  “ heroic struggle ” against feudalism and colonialism. Z HONGHUA 
R ENMIN G ONGHEGUO X IAN FA pmbl. paras. 1 – 2,  available at  http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/
constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=0 (last visited April 6, 2007). 
 23  Deng Xiaoping,  Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong (Sept. 24, 1984),  reprinted in D ENG 
X IAOPING ON  “ O NE C OUNTRY , T WO S YSTEMS ” 1 ( Joint Publishing 2004). 
 24  Id. , at 3. 
 25  J OHN F LOWERDEW , T HE F INAL Y EARS OF B RITISH H ONG K ONG 31 (Macmillan 1998). 
 26  G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 42; B OB B EATTY , D EMOCRACY , A SIAN V ALUES, AND H ONG K ONG 14 (Praeger 
Publishers 2003). 
 27  T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 218. 
 28  G OODSTADT ,  supra note 14, at 49. 
 29  The Hong Kong Government had not even been informed about the secretary’s visit to Beijing. 
 See F LOWERDEW ,  supra note 25, at 40. 
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Parliament, 30 the meeting took place in  “ very unsympathetic atmosphere. ” 31 
Once again, they were told that they  “ did not represent the views of the people 
of Hong Kong. ” 32 Nor were any concessions made with regard to a possible 
right of abode in Britain for Hong Kong citizens should the territory be returned 
to China. 33 They could apply for  “ British National (Overseas) ” status, 34 which, 
however, did not confer the right of abode. Despite the  “ moral obligation ” 
toward Hong Kong stressed by many politicians, 35 Britain did not wish to take 
over any legal obligation. 
 After protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom and China agreed in a Joint 
Declaration that the latter would  “ resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong with effect from 1 July 1997. ” 36 The declaration was based on the principle 
of  “ one country, two systems, ” whereby the mainland would maintain its social-
ist system and Hong Kong its capitalist system. 37 It is important to remember that 
this principle was originally devised for the reuniﬁ cation of Taiwan and China. 38 
At the time, Taiwan was as much a one-party state as the People’s Republic; 
thus, the  “ two systems ” did not have a political connotation but referred to the 
coexistence of two different economic systems within one country. 39 
 30  C HUNG S ZE -Y UEN ,  What has Gone Wrong During the Transition? in H ONG K ONG’S T RANSITION 4 (Wang 
Gungwu & Wong Siu-lun eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1995); F LOWERDEW ,  supra note 25, at 44. 
 31  C HUNG ,  supra note 30, at 4. 
 32  By former prime minister Edward Heath (quoted by F LOWERDEW ,  supra note 25, at 44). The foreign 
secretary Geoffrey Howe pointed out to the delegation that, not being elected by the people, they 
could not speak for the people.  See C HUNG S ZE -Y UE , HONG K ONG’S J OURNEY TO R EUNIFICATION 87 – 88 (Chi-
nese Univ. Press 2001). This view somewhat neglected British responsibility for the absence of an 
electoral element to Hong Kong’s government. 
 33  The 1962 and 1968 Immigration Acts had limited the right of abode in the United Kingdom for 
colonial subjects if their parents or grandparents had not been born in the United Kingdom. With 
the 1981 British Nationality Act, a new category of British Dependent Territories Citizenship was 
introduced for colonial subjects; this category, to which over three million Hong Kongers belonged, 
did not entail the right of abode.  See A NTHONY B RADLEY & K EITH E WING , C ONSTITUTIONAL AND A DMINISTRA-
TIVE L AW 427 – 435 (Pearson Longman 2003). 
 34  Hong Kong Act, 1985, c. 15, § 2(2), sched. 2(1)(b) (U.K.). 
 35  TSANG,  supra note 7, at 214. 
 36  Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong art. 1, China-U.K., Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 
61. 
 37  Deng Xiaoping,  One Country, Two Systems (June 22-23, 1984),  reprinted in D ENG ,  supra note 23, 
at 13 – 18. 
 38  Peng Zhen,  Report on the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the PRC, Delivered at the 5 th Session of 
the 5 th NPC on November 26, 1982 ,  in F IFTH S ESSION OF THE F IFTH N ATIONAL P EOPLE’S C ONGRESS 99 – 101 
(Foreign Language Press Beijing 1983). 
 39  Deng,  supra note 37, at 14. 
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 “ Taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, ” the People’s 
Republic would thus, in accordance with article 31 of the Chinese Constitution, 40 
establish a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that would enjoy  “ a high 
degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs which are the respon-
sibilities of the Central People’s Government. ” 41 With regard to the region’s 
constitutional structure, the declaration provided for a chief executive to be 
appointed by the CPG, based on  “ elections or consultations to be held locally. ” 42 
The executive authorities would be accountable to the legislature, 43 which was 
to be  “ constituted by elections. ” 44 The laws previously in force in Hong Kong 
(that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation, 
and customary law) would be maintained; 45 the power of ﬁ nal judgment, 
which had previously rested with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 46 
would be transferred to a court of ﬁ nal appeal in the HKSAR. 47 China promised 
to enshrine the provisions of the declaration in the Basic Law to be promul-
gated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and which would remain 
unchanged for ﬁ fty years. 48 During the years leading up to 1997, China and 
the United Kingdom agreed to cooperate in maintaining Hong Kong’s social 
stability and economic prosperity; 49 to this end, they would establish a Joint 
Liaison Group. 50 
 The concept of  “ one country, two systems ” was seen, at least by the Chinese 
side, as a panacea for any difﬁ culty the return of Hong Kong might entail. Deng 
Xiaoping even promoted it as  “ a new approach to stabilizing the world situa-
tion. ” 51 Yet this enthusiasm glossed over the intricacies of such an innovative 
approach. While the combination of different legal systems in one state was 
 40  This provision had been added to the Constitution with a view to Hong Kong in December 1982. 
 See T SANG,  supra note 7, at 221. 
 41  Joint Declaration,  supra note 36, art. 3(2). 
 42  Id. , art. 3(4). 
 43  Id. , Annex I art. 1(3). 
 44  Id. , Annex I art. 1(3). 
 45  Id. , Annex I art. 2(1). 
 46  W ESLEY -S MITH ,  supra note 16 at 138. 
 47  Joint Declaration,  supra note 36, Annex I art. 3(4). 
 48  Id. , art. 3(12). 
 49  Id. , art. 4. 
 50  Id. , art. 5 and Annex II. 
 51  Deng Xiaoping,  A new approach to stabilizing the World Situation (February 22, 1984),  reprinted in 
D ENG ,  supra note 23, at 11 – 12. 
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not new, 52 there was no precedent for two different economic systems operat-
ing within a single sovereign state. 53 The Chinese economy may have begun to 
adopt capitalist characteristics, yet it has remained centrally governed and 
planned. Further, by focusing on economics, the concept of  “ one country, two 
systems ” might underestimate the extent to which a free economy presupposes 
freedom in other areas or might encourage demands for such freedom. 
 The agreement on Hong Kong’s future was peculiar in another sense. The 
autonomy of a subnational entity is usually the result of a progressive develop-
ment, entailing an open-ended process. At the beginning of the process, it is 
not clear whether, or to what extent, autonomy eventually will be granted or 
achieved. 54 China, on the other hand, promised Hong Kong a high degree of 
autonomy from the outset but provided only sketchy details of the implemen-
tation of this promise. Many aspects of the territory’s autonomy, such as the 
constitutional setup, would only be implemented after the handover. In addi-
tion, autonomy was guaranteed for a limited period of time only and would 
become discretionary after ﬁ fty years. 
 1.3.  The transitional period 
 These contradictions ﬁ rst became apparent in the work of the Joint Liaison 
Group. The  “ co-operative relationship ” and  “ friendly spirit ” 55 with which this 
group was intended to operate did not prevail for long. The Chinese were sus-
picious that Britain, as an imperial power, was intent on draining Hong Kong 
of its wealth before handing it back. 56 They were particularly wary of British 
attempts to allow Hong Kong’s citizens a greater say in politics. The Chinese 
side maintained that Britain should wait for China to draft the Basic Law and 
 52  The Roman concept of  ius gentium provided for the application of Roman law to Roman citizens 
and of a modiﬁ ed version to foreigners or  peregrini within the Roman empire. M AX K ASER , I US 
G ENTIUM 4 – 6 (Forschungen zum Römischen Recht 40, Böhlau 1993). This distinction continued to 
form the basis of the early medieval  leges barbarorum . Today, different legal systems within one 
state are usually linked to federal divisions, such as the civil law systems in Louisiana or in Québec, 
Sharia law in twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-seven states, or tribal law in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas of Pakistan. In the Macau SAR, Portuguese law continues to be applied in much the 
same way as the common law in Hong Kong.  See L EI  BÁSICA DA R EGIÃO A DMINISTRATIVA E SPECIAL DE 
M ACAU (Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau) art. 8. 
 53  In Macau, the Basic Law of which is largely identical to Hong Kong’s, the capitalist system is also 
protected for ﬁ fty years. L EI B ÁSICA art. 5. 
 54  Some recent examples include devolution in the United Kingdom and additional powers for 
Spain’s Autonomous Communities. Uncertainty also persists with regard to Kosovo, where a form 
of supervised independence has been suggested.  See On the Road to Independence , T HE ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 3, 2007, at 11. 
 55  Joint Declaration,  supra note 36, Annex II art. 1. 
 56  Deng Xiaoping,  We shall be paying close attention to developments in Hong Kong during the Transition 
period (July 31, 1984),  reprinted in D ENG ,  supra note 23, at 19 – 22. 
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then make sure that British administration up to 1997 would match or syn-
chronize with the provisions of this law. This approach became known as 
 “ convergence, ” and the United Kingdom eventually agreed to it in 1986. 57 
 Still, 1985 had seen, for the ﬁ rst time, twenty-four out of ﬁ fty-seven legisla-
tive councillors returned by election rather than gubernatorial appointment. 
However, no direct electoral system was introduced: twelve members were 
selected by an electoral college and another twelve by  “ functional constituen-
cies, ” that is, business groups and professional organizations. 58 Since the early 
days of the colony, similar schemes had been used to enable certain groups 
and institutions — such as justices of the peace and the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce — to nominate an unofﬁ cial LegCo member. 59 However, 
suggestions by the Colonial Ofﬁ ce in London to expand and institutionalize 
such constituencies were rejected by subsequent governors, who argued that 
even indirect elections might jeopardize the stability of the colony by granting 
too much participation to its (Chinese) inhabitants. 60 The prospect of the terri-
tory’s return to China, however, made some degree of political reform un -
avoidable. If the Joint Declaration were to be accepted by Parliament (and the 
British public), it would have to offer a semblance of democracy for Hong 
Kongers. 61 Thus, the idea of functional constituencies, previously spurned, 
made its comeback. By 1985, however, this concept provided an inadequate 
and anachronistic approach to public participation, recalling the guild system 
in the towns of late medieval Europe. Presumably, it served the same 
purpose — to keep political control ﬁ rmly within the business and merchant 
classes. 
 The functional constituencies are a unique feature of the Hong Kong consti-
tutional system, similar, at least in principle, to the university constituencies in 
the British House of Commons, through which certain universities provided 
a number of MPs. 62 Today, the Lords Spiritual and, when not concerned 
with legal matters, the Law Lords in the House of Lords, might be considered 
 57  T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 233 – 236. 
 58  M INERS ,  supra note 8, at 26. The origins of functional constituencies date back to 1884.  See T SANG , 
 supra note 10, at 3). 
 59  G OODSTADT ,  supra note 14, at 43. 
 60  Alexander Grantham, governor from 1947 – 1957, objected on the grounds that the constituen-
cies necessitated by such a scheme would enfranchise  “ enthusiastic but inexperienced bodies who 
have little knowledge of wider policy and whose true value to the community has still to be meas-
ured. ” G OODSTADT ,  supra note 14, at 50. Doubts about the loyalty of Britain’s Chinese subjects also 
lingered. 
 61  T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 231. 
 62  The universities’ representatives were selected by their respective graduates. The constituencies 
were abolished in 1948, prior to the 1950 elections.  See F.W.S. C RAIG , B OUNDARIES OF P ARLIAMENTARY 
C ONSTITUENCIES 46 (Political Research Publications 1972). 
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functional constituencies of a sort. 63 A similar arrangement is found in the 
upper house of the Irish parliament, the Seanad Éireann. 64 
 The introduction of functional constituencies in Hong Kong scarcely repre-
sented a dramatic rush to participatory government. Out of a population of 
5,456,200, only 46,645 electors (including corporations) could vote in the 
1985 functional constituencies elections. 65 Nonetheless, even this cautious 
approach provoked the Chinese side to insist that this change in the composi-
tion of LegCo constituted a breach of the Joint Declaration, even though a 
change along these lines was mandated by the Declaration, which provided for 
the election of LegCo by 1997 at the latest. Under Chinese pressure, Britain 
eventually agreed not to introduce any major changes until the Basic Law was 
promulgated in 1990. 66 
 1.3.1.  The drafting of the Basic Law 
 The Joint Declaration had provided only general guidelines for the constitu-
tional makeup of the HKSAR and for its relationship with the CPG, leaving it to 
the Basic Law to set forth more detailed provisions. This Basic Law would 
implement the Joint Declaration and, at the same time, prescribe the  “ system 
to be instituted ” in the HKSAR. 67 Its drafting began in June 1985 with the 
establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), appointed by the 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) and operating under 
 63  In judicial matters, the Law Lords constitute the United Kingdom’s ﬁ nal court of appeal. The 
Lords Spiritual consist of twenty-six bishops of the Church of England.  See B RADLEY & E WING ,  supra 
note 33, at 174. 
 64  Forty-nine of sixty members of the Seanad are selected by vocational panels akin to functional 
constituencies, and six members are dispatched by university constituencies. The remaining elev-
en members are nominated by the Taoiseach (prime minister). IR. C ONST . art. 18. The powers of the 
Senead, however, are limited, and it cannot block legislation passed by the lower house, the Dáil 
Éireann. IR. C ONST . art. 23(1). The vocational panel system seems set to be reformed, with the pan-
els abolished and directly elected members introduced. Johannes Chan,  Recent Political Reform in 
the Republic of Ireland ,  in  HONG KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 62 (Johannes Chan & Lison Harris eds., 
Hong Kong L.J. Ltd. 2005). 
 65  HKSAR G OVERNMENT C ENSUS AND S TATISTICS D EPARTMENT , D EMOGRAPHIC T RENDS IN H ONG K ONG 1981 –
 2001 8 (HKSAR Government Printing Department 2002); F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES ,  supra note 
13, Appendix 5. 
 66  T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 232 – 233. It also abandoned plans to introduce further reforms in 1988. 
In 1987 a survey had been conducted on constitutional change, based on a Green Paper strong-
ly discouraging support for direct elections. Still, a majority of respondents favored the introduc-
tion of direct elections to LegCo, and the Survey Ofﬁ ce had to tweak the results of the public 
consultations to obtain the desired outcome for its 1988 White Paper.  See M INERS ,  supra note 8, at 
26 – 27). 
 67  X IAN FA art. 31 (P.R.C.). 
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the guidance of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Ofﬁ ce. 68 A 
group of senior members of the Communist Party of China, including Deng 
Xiaoping, provided overall direction. Deng also reminded the members of the 
BLDC that the Basic Law would have to allow for intervention by the CPG, as 
there might be  “ things [Hong Kong] will ﬁ nd hard to settle without the help of 
the Central Government, ” and as Britain would not be there any longer to 
help. 69 It  “ simply wouldn’t work ” if  “ Hong Kong’s affairs were administered 
solely by Hong Kong people while the Central Government had nothing to do 
with the matter. ” 70 Also, there could be forces in Hong Kong  “ that might 
engage in obstruction or sabotage, ” and China would not allow them  “ to con-
vert Hong Kong into a base of opposition to the mainland under the pretext of 
 ‘ democracy. ’ ” In such a situation, China  “ would have no choice but to 
intervene. ” 71 
 With regard to the constitutional system, Deng explained that it would not 
be appropriate to create a replica of Western systems with the separation of 
three powers or a parliamentary system; nor would it be  “ appropriate for peo-
ple to judge whether Hong Kong’s system is democratic on the basis of whether 
it has those features. ” 72 Deng also stated that he did not think it would  “ be good 
for Hong Kong ” to hold general elections. Hong Kong’s administrators should 
be  “ people from Hong Kong who love the motherland and Hong Kong, ” but a 
general election would not  “ necessarily bring out people like that. ” 73 If ever 
general elections were held, it would have to be after a transition period and 
through a gradual process. 74 And it would always be on the premise that 
 “ patriots form the main body of  … the future government of the Hong Kong 
special region. ” 75 
 68  Of the BLDC’s ﬁ fty-nine members, thirty-six were from mainland China and twenty-three from 
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong members had been appointed by the New China News Agency (Xin-
hua) in Hong Kong. The BLDC was complemented by a Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) 
of 180 appointed Hong Kongers. For a detailed account, see G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 56, and Chan, 
 supra note 1, at  5 – 8. 
 69  Deng Xiaoping, Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Committee for the Drafting of the 
Basic Law of the HKSAR (April 16, 1987),  reprinted in D ENG ,  supra note  23, at 77. 
 70  Id. , at 76. This somewhat contradicts Deng’s earlier statement that China  “ should have faith in 
the Chinese of Hong Kong, who are quite capable of administering their own affairs. ” Deng,  supra 
note 37, at 16. 
 71  Deng,  supra note 69, at 77. 
 72  Id. , at 75. 
 73  Id. , at 75 – 76. 
 74  Id. , at 76. 
 75  Deng,  supra note 37, at 17. According to Deng,  “ a patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, 
sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to 
impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. ” 
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 A ﬁ rst draft of the Basic Law was published in April 1988, 76 a second one in 
February 1989. 77 In accordance with article 31 of the Chinese Constitution, 
the ﬁ nal version was promulgated by the NPC on April 4, 1990. It entered into 
force with the establishment of the HKSAR on July 1, 1997. 
 1.3.2.  Constitutional reforms after 1989 
 By the time the Basic Law was promulgated in 1990, the political climate in 
Hong Kong had already changed dramatically with the suppression of the stu-
dent movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Hong Kongers had shown 
their support for the Chinese students by several demonstrations, some of them 
numbering over one million participants 78 — or about 15 percent of the entire 
population. Suddenly, the Joint Declaration seemed a frail protection against 
the tanks of the People’s Army. The British government came under strong 
pressure to accelerate the process of democratization in Hong Kong, 79 and to 
reconsider its stance on immigration policy. 80 There was a general, if belated, 
sense of guilt on the British side, both with regard to  “ the painful history of 
nationality legislation, ” and the  “ failure to introduce democracy to Hong Kong 
well before the negotiations. ” 81 Nonetheless, the British government of the day 
insisted that granting the right of abode to 3.25 million holders of British 
Dependent Territories passports was not an option. 82 Instead, the  “ overriding 
aim ” of the government was to encourage  “ people whose service [was] of 
value to Hong Kong to remain there. ” 83 In addition, the British government 
announced the introduction of a bill of rights for Hong Kong in July 1989, 84 
 76  The Draft Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (for Solicitation of Opinions),  reprinted in T HE H ONG 
K ONG B ASIC L AW ,  supra note 1, at 63 – 91. 
 77  The Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (Draft),  reprinted in T HE H ONG K ONG B ASIC L AW ,  supra 
note 1, at 145 – 161. 
 78  F LOWERDEW ,  supra note 25, at 66. 
 79  T HATCHER ,  supra note 21, at 495. Unofﬁ cial Members of LegCo and ExCo started lobbying the Brit-
ish government and Parliament. C HUNG ,  supra note 30, at 11. 
 80  Paddy Ashdown MP (Liberal Democrats), House of Commons Debate on China and Hong Kong, 
July 13, 1989,  reprinted in T HE H ONG K ONG B ASIC L AW ,  supra note 1, at 253. 
 81  P ERCY C RADOCK , E XPERIENCES OF C HINA 248 – 249 (John Murray 1994). Sir Percy Cradock had been 
British ambassador to Beijing, and foreign policy adviser to both Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Major. He 
led the British delegation during Sino-British negotiations in Beijing. 
 82  Sir Geoffrey Howe MP, Statement by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, 
July 5, 1989,  reprinted in T HE H ONG K ONG B ASIC L AW ,  supra note 1, at 246 – 247. 
 83  Sir Geoffrey Howe MP, House of Commons Debate on China and Hong Kong, July 13, 1989, 
 reprinted in T HE H ONG K ONG B ASIC L AW ,  supra note 1, at 250. To this end, key groups were eligible for 
full citizenship under the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990, c. 34 (U.K.). It was hoped that 
this safety net might persuade them to stay on. 
 84  Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 363, No. 59 of 1991. 
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which would incorporate most of the provisions of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as they applied to Hong Kong, into the 
laws of the colony. 85 The qualiﬁ cation is signiﬁ cant as Britain had made several 
reservations on the application of the ICCPR to Hong Kong, most notably with 
regard to the establishment of an elected legislature. 86 
 In response to the demands for extending public participation, 87 eighteen 
directly elected LegCo seats were introduced in 1991, with a further twenty-
one selected by the functional constituencies. With this relatively low number, 
Britain could secure Chinese acquiescence and the prospect of the 1995 LegCo’s 
tenure spanning the handover (the so-called  “ through train ” ). 88 Furthermore, 
in early 1990 China agreed to the direct election of twenty LegCo members in 
1997, twenty-four in 1999, and thirty in 2003. 89 Governor Patten, whose 
appointment in 1992 was also meant to underline Britain’s commitment, 90 
raised the number of directly elected members to twenty for the 1995 LegCo 
elections, with thirty members elected by functional constituencies and ten by 
an Election Committee. Patten considered the functional constituencies an 
 “ abomination, ” similar to the  “ worst abuses of British eighteenth-century 
parliamentary history. ” 91 
 85  H ONG K ONG G OVERNMENT , A N I NTRODUCTION TO THE B ILL OF R IGHTS 3 (Printing Department 1991). Not 
all provisions were incorporated, with the right to self-determination (provided for by ICCPR art. 1) 
the most notable absence. 
 86  The United Kingdom reserved the right not to apply ICCPR art. 25(b) insofar as it may require 
the establishment of an elected legislature in Hong Kong.  See 1007 U.N.T.S. 394. The Bill of Rights 
stated explicitly that the right to vote and to be elected in periodic universal elections did  “ not re-
quire the establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative Council ” (Bill of Rights Ordinance, 
(1991) III, 13). The ordinance was not adopted in its entirety into the law of the HKSAR under 
 Basic Law art. 160; most importantly, the provisions requiring interpretation in accordance with 
the ICCPR were not adopted by the NPCSC. 
 87  T HATCHER ,  supra note 21, at 495. 
 88  Message of U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd MP to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
(Feb. 12, 1990),  reprinted in G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS ,  supra note 7, at 97. This arrangement was 
referred to as the  “ through train. ”  See Decision of the National People’s Congress on the Method of the 
Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region , April 4, 1990, para. 6,  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/
index.htm . 
 89  G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS ,  supra note 7, at 97; T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 250. 
 90  Contrary to most previous governors, who were senior civil servants, Patten was a politician. As 
chairman of the Conservative Party, he ran a successful Tory campaign for John Major in 1992 
and was, therefore, close to the prime minister.  See C HRIS P ATTEN , E AST AND W EST 13 – 15 (Macmillan 
1998). 
 91  Id. , at 58. On the uneven distribution of House of Commons constituencies before 1832, see 
B RADLEY & E WING ,  supra note 33, at 151. 
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 In 1991, the functional constituencies comprised 69,825 eligible voters or 
slightly more than 1 percent of the population. 92 However, as indirect elections 
were part of the electoral agreements with China, the functional constituencies 
could not be abolished; instead, Patten increased their number to thirty and 
enlarged the electorate so that each individual who worked in a profession or 
business sector was entitled to vote in his or her respective constituency. He also 
abolished corporate voting. 93 With 1,150,000 individuals entitled to vote for a 
functional constituency, 94 the governor signiﬁ cantly reduced the inequalities 
linked to the indirect electoral system. To an outraged China, however, these 
arrangements violated the  “ spirit ” of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law; 95 it was decided that after the handover, the 1995 LegCo would be replaced 
by an appointed Provisional LegCo — the through train had broken down. 96 
 With hindsight, this outcome should not have been surprising. China had 
made it clear from the very outset that it would not condone any fundamental 
changes to the status quo before the handover. Nor would it accept that its future 
Hong Kong subjects would have a say in their own future. Even though China 
had denounced British imperialist rule and stressed the ability of Hong Kongers 
to look after themselves, it was not willing to acquiesce in any last-minute 
attempts by Britain to introduce democratic elements into Hong Kong’s govern-
ment. Despite Governor Patten’s commitment, such attempts did lack convic-
tion, seeing that they began a century and a half after colonial rule, and only 
once the return of the territory to China had become inevitable. And even at this 
stage, the British government still seemed more concerned about a possible inﬂ ux 
of refugees than with the future fate of its erstwhile Hong Kong subjects. 
 The transitional period shows clearly that Chinese opposition to the intro-
duction of democratic elements in Hong Kong is not a new attitude but has 
 92  This number still includes corporate votes. F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES ,  supra note 13, Appendix 5. 
In 1991, Hong Kong’s population had risen to 5,752,000. HKSAR G OVERNMENT ,  supra note 65, 
at 8. 
 93  Furthermore, Patten stopped appointments to the district boards (later district councils), which 
were, as a consequence, selected through elections only. For an account of Patten’s reforms, see 
T SANG ,  supra note 7, at 256. 
 94  F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES ,  supra note 13, Appendix 5; in 1995, the entire population of Hong 
Kong amounted to 6,156,100. HKSAR G OVERNMENT ,  supra note 65, at 8. 
 95  The Basic Law, however, was in no way binding on the British side; in addition, the CPG failed 
to elucidate  which provisions of the declaration had been breached. P ATTEN ,  supra note 90, at 
65 – 69. 
 96  On the  “ through train ” see note 88,  supra ; on the selection of the Provisional LegCo, see J AMES 
T ANG ,  The Special Administrative Region Government and the Changing Political Order in Hong Kong ,  in 
 MINERS ,  supra note 8, at 249 – 254. For a comprehensive overview of constitutional development up 
to 1997, see Benny Tai Yiu-ting,  The Development of Constitutionalism in Hong Kong ,  in T HE N EW 
L EGAL O RDER IN H ONG K ONG 39 – 69 (Raymond Wacks ed., Hong Kong Univ. Press 1999). 
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been a consistent policy for almost three decades. It also illustrates that the 
new sovereign has the same qualms about elections the United Kingdom itself 
had over so many years — the essential dilemma being, simply, that outcomes 
are decided by the voters rather than the rulers. 
 2.  Constitutional reform in the HKSAR: Dramatis personae 
 2.1.  Actors in the HKSAR 
 2.1.1.  The Hong Kong executive 
 According to the Basic Law, the HKSAR is headed by a chief executive with 
extensive powers. 97 Some of these are powers commonly vested in the execu-
tive branch, such as heading the administration, 98 implementing laws, 99 issu-
ing executive orders, 100 nominating principal ofﬁ cials, 101 and conducting 
external affairs. 102 Yet the chief executive also has to approve the introduction 
of bills regarding expenditure and revenues. 103 He signs bills and budgets 
passed by LegCo, and he promulgates laws. 104 In addition, he appoints and 
removes judges at all levels. 105 Thus, the term  “ executive-led ” is an apt descrip-
tion of the constitutional system. In fact, the Basic Law’s provisions concerning 
the chief executive are reminiscent of the powers allocated to the governor by 
the Letters Patent. 106 The balance between legislature and executive is heavily 
tilted in favor of the latter. In the event of conﬂ ict, the chief executive can dis-
solve LegCo — with the restriction that he may do so only once in each term of 
his ofﬁ ce. 107 LegCo, on the other hand, can only instigate impeachment proce-
dures but has no control over their outcome. 108 
 The chief executive is formally appointed by the CPG — as was the governor 
by the British government — for a term of ﬁ ve years, after being selected by 
 97  Basic Law ch. IV § 1. 
 98  Id. , art. 48(1) and 60. 
 99  Id. , 48(2). 
 100  Id. , 48(4). 
 101  Id. , 48(5). 
 102  Id. , 48(9). On the distinction between foreign and external affairs in the Chinese version, see 
G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 461. 
 103  Basic Law art. 48(10). 
 104  Basic Law art. 48(3). 
 105  Basic Law art. 48(6). 
 106  See supra notes 7 – 9 and accompanying text. 
 107  Basic Law art. 49 and 50. Only if a newly elected LegCo continues to oppose the chief executive 
will he have to resign.  Basic Law arts. 52(2) and (3). 
 108  See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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election or through consultations held locally. 109 Article 45(2) of the Basic Law 
states that the method for selecting the chief executive shall be speciﬁ ed  “ in the 
light of the actual situation ” in the territory and  “ in accordance with the prin-
ciple of gradual and orderly progress. ” The eventual aim is the  “ selection of the 
Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly represent-
ative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. ” 110 
Annex I speciﬁ es that  “ if there is a need to amend the method for selecting the 
Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, ” such amend-
ments would have to be endorsed by two-thirds of LegCo and by the chief exec-
utive, and be reported to the NPCSC for approval. 111 
 Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping magnate, had been appointed the ﬁ rst chief 
executive in 1997 by the CPG. 112 Despite a generally uninspiring performance, 
he was granted a second term in 2002. In 2003, however, his botched han-
dling of security legislation led to large-scale protests 113 and convinced Beijing 
to look for alternatives. In March 2005, the CPG appointed Tung to an advi-
sory post reserved for retired functionaries, 114 and he duly resigned his ofﬁ ce 
within days — citing health reasons, the only justiﬁ cation offered by the Basic 
Law for such a unilateral step. 115 The sole candidate for his succession was 
Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, previously chief secretary for administration of the 
HKSAR, who was appointed chief executive by the CPG on June 21, 2005. 116 
 109  Basic Law arts. 43, 46 and 45(1). 
 110  The initial composition of this nominating body — the Election Committee — is set out in  Basic 
Law Annex I art. 2. 
 111  Basic Law Annex I art. 7. 
 112  Previously, he had served as an unofﬁ cial member of Chris Patten’s Executive Council. Under 
his father, the family business had been bailed out by the P.R.C.  See The New Merchant Prince , T HE 
E CONOMIST , July 5, 1997, at 68. 
 113  Under  Basic Law art. 23, the HKSAR government is required to enact laws  “ to prohibit any act 
of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of 
state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activi-
ties in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing 
ties with foreign political organizations or bodies. ” After large demonstrations with more than half 
a million participants, the government delayed implementation of its proposals.  See Hong Kong 
rebels—Rebellion; Hong Kong and China , T HE E CONOMIST , July 12, 2003, at 10. For detailed discussion, 
see N ATIONAL S ECURITY AND F UNDAMENTAL F REEDOMS : H ONG K ONG’S A RTICLE 23 U NDER S CRUTINY (Fu Hualing, 
Carole J. Petersen & Simon Young eds., Hong Kong Univ. Press 2005). 
 114  Time runs out for China’s loyal servant , T HE E CONOMIST , March 5, 2005, at 63. 
 115  Basic Law art. 52(1). 
 116  CE to Take Oath in Beijing , HKSAR Government press release, June 21, 2005,  available at  http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200506/21/06210158.htm . On the issue of the length of his term, 
see  infra note 175 and accompanying text. Donald Tsang had served as Financial Secretary of 
Chris Patten from 1995 – 1997; in 1997, he received a knighthood (KBE).  See A Knight of the Peo-
ple’s Paradise , T HE E CONOMIST , June 16, 2005, at 60. 
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 2.1.2.  LegCo 
 Compared to the executive, the LegCo’s powers are restricted: its sixty mem-
bers may introduce bills relating to government policies only with the written 
consent of the chief executive. 117 Apart from approving budgets, taxation, and 
public expenditures, 118 its role is limited to debating and raising questions 
about acts of the government. 119 Furthermore, any amendment to the Basic 
Law requires approval by two-thirds of its members. 120 And while the chief 
executive may dissolve LegCo, the latter does not have the power to act on 
impeachment. It may initiate investigations into perceived misdeeds of the 
chief executive and, consequently, pass a motion of impeachment. Yet the ﬁ nal 
decision is left to the CPG. 121 
 Annex II to the Basic Law provides rules for the election of the ﬁ rst three leg-
islatures after the handover. 122 In accordance with these rules, the provisional 
LegCo of 1997 was replaced in 1998 with thirty members selected by func-
tional constituencies, ten by the Election Committee, and twenty by geographi-
cal constituencies through direct elections. 123 In 2000, six members were 
selected by the committee and the number of directly elected members increased 
to 24. 124 In 2004, thirty members were elected directly and thirty by functional 
constituencies. 125 The 2004 elections were preceded by a Chinese campaign 
starting with the republication by the New China News Agency (Xinhua) of the 
 117  Basic Law art. 74. 
 118  Basic Law arts. 73(2) and (3). 
 119  Basic Law arts. 73(3) – (9). 
 120  Basic Law art. 159(2). For a detailed discussion of LegCo, see G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 259 – 262. 
 121  Basic Law art. 73(9). 
 122  The Basic Law did not provide for a Provisional LegCo ( cf. supra note 96), the legality of which 
was consequently challenged in the Court of Final Appeal (HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David [1997] 
H.K.L.R.D 761). The Court held that the 1998 LegCo was the  “ First LegCo ” referred to by the Basic 
Law, while the Provisional LegCo had been an  “ interim measure ” necessitated by the derailment 
of the through train.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 123  Basic Law Annex II art. I. The Election Committee was identical to the one selecting the Chief 
Executive. The number of eligible voters in the functional constituencies had been reduced to 
127,075 after the handover, and corporate voting was reintroduced.  Cf. supra notes 91  – 94 . Also, 
the Provisional LegCo had changed the voting system, favoring pro-China forces.  See G HAI ,  supra 
note 13, at 260, note 16. A member of the Committee who was also enfranchised in a functional 
constituency thus held three votes: one in the Committee, and one each in a functional and a geo-
graphical constituency. 
 124  Basic Law Annex II art. I(1). For the results of the elections in the geographical constituencies, 
see  http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/legco2004/eindex.html (last visited April 6, 2007). 
 125  Basic Law Annex II art. I(1). For the results of the elections in the geographical constituencies, 
see  http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/legco2004/eindex.html (last visited April 6, 2007). 
For discussion, see Ma Ngok,  Pluralization Amidst Polarization: The 2004 LegCo Election ,  in  HONG 
KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES,  supra note 64, at 135 – 142. 
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late Deng Xiaoping’s remarks on the concept of  “ one country, two systems. ” 126 
As the People’s Daily (the CPG’s organ) stressed, this republication was  “ by no 
means coincidental ” but was intended to  “ point out certain confusions and 
misconceptions in the recent debate on constitutional development in the SAR 
and clarify them at the level of principle. ” 127 Reference was mainly made to 
Deng’s statement on patriots governing Hong Kong, and to his rejection of uni-
versal suffrage. 128 The accusation of Hong Kong democrats being  “ unpatriotic ” 
was soon added to the barrage. 129 Other traditional means to ferment patriotic 
feelings, such as military parades, visits by athletes, greetings from astronauts, 
and incriminations against democratic candidates were also used. 130 
 For the next election, due in 2008, the Basic Law provides only that the 
method for forming LegCo  “ shall be speciﬁ ed in the light of the actual situation 
in the HKSAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly 
progress, ” with the ultimate aim of having all members elected by universal 
suffrage. 131 Procedural provisions in annex II — largely mirroring those gov-
erning the selection of the chief executive — add that  “ if there is a need ” to 
change the method for forming LegCo after 2007, any amendment would have 
to be supported by two-thirds of LegCo and the chief executive. While changes 
in the method for selecting the chief executive need NPCSC approval, amend-
ments on the LegCo election method have to be reported to the NPCSC merely 
for the record. 132 
 2.2.  Mainland actors 
 2.2.1.  The central authorities 
 Accounts of the constitutional structure of the HKSAR generally focus on the 
institutions of the territory: the chief executive, LegCo, and the judiciary. As 
 126  Deng’s Remarks on  “ One Country, Two Systems ” republished , P EOPLE’S D AILY , Feb. 19, 2004. 
 127  Why It’s Vital to Recall What Deng Said About HK , P EOPLE’S D AILY , Feb. 20, 2004. 
 128  See supra notes 73 and 75. 
 129  The leader of the pro-Beijing Liberal Party in Hong Kong went as far as to state that opposition 
to the communist party was unpatriotic.  See Liberal Leader Supports Beijing on Democrats , S OUTH 
C HINA M ORNING P OST , March 2, 2004. This is difﬁ cult to reconcile with Deng’s reassurance that pa-
triots do not have to be  “ in favor of China’s socialist system. ” Deng,  supra note 37, at 17. 
 130  Klaudia Lee,  Election Outcome Worries Beijing, S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , March 2, 2004; Jimmy 
Cheung,  “ One Country ” Is Given TV Treatment , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , April 5, 2004; Jimmy 
Cheung,  PLA Sends Patriotic Message with First HK Parade , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Aug. 2, 2004; 
Jonathan Powell,  China’s Gold Medal Winners to Perform in Hong Kong , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Sept. 8, 2004; Jimmy Cheung et al.,  Democrat  “ Jailed After Frame-up with Prostitute, ” S OUTH C HINA 
M ORNING P OST , Aug. 17, 2004. 
 131  Basic Law art. 68(2). 
 132  Basic Law Annex II art. III.  See supra notes 110 and 111, and accompanying text. 
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central as these institutions may be to governing Hong Kong, they are not 
autonomous in the true sense of the word. They may instigate policies, imple-
ment, or change them; at some point, however, external approbation from 
China is required. Thus, chapter II of the Basic Law sets out the  “ relationship 
between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR. ” 
 According to the Chinese Constitution, the Central Authorities of the 
People’s Republic of China consist, inter alia, of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), its Standing Committee (NPCSC), the president of the People’s Republic, 
the State Council or Central People’s Government (CPG), the Central Military 
Commission, and the People’s Courts. 133 Of these, the NPC, the NPCSC, and the 
CPG are of particular importance with regard to Hong Kong. 
 The NPC is the  “ highest organ of state power ” with supreme legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority. 134 It comprises close to 3,000 deputies and 
convenes only once a year. 135 The NPC is vested with the power of amending 
the Basic Law of the HKSAR. 136 
 The CPG, or State Council, is the executive body of the NPC and the supreme 
organ of state administration. It consists of the premier, vice premiers, state 
councillors, ministers, the auditor general and the secretary-general. 137 The 
CPG appoints the chief executive of the HKSAR and the principal ofﬁ cials of the 
executive authorities 138 and is responsible for matters touching upon China’s 
sovereignty.13 9 
 The NPCSC is the permanent body of the NPC and holds a wide range of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers; 140 in particular, article 67(4) of 
the Constitution vests the NPCSC with the authority to interpret laws. 141 On 
speciﬁ c issues, it is the NPCSC that has the ﬁ nal say on most Hong Kong 
affairs. In some instances, the Hong Kong government reports to the NPCSC 
 133  XIAN FA ch. III (P.R.C.). 
 134  XIAN FA arts. 57, 62 – 65. 
 135  XIAN FA art. 61. 
 136  Basic Law art. 159(1). 
 137  XIAN FA arts. 85 and 86. 
 138  Basic Law arts. 15, 45 and 48(5). 
 139  Basic Law arts. 13 (foreign affairs), 14 (defense), 131 and 132 (air service agreements), and 
150, 152, 153 and 155 (authorization for matters of external affairs). 
 140  It may, inter alia, enact and amend laws (X IAN F A art. 67(2)), grant pardons (art. 67(17)), and 
decide on mobilization (art. 67(19)). 
 141  For detailed discussion of the basis and use of this authority see Wen Hongshi,  Interpretation of 
Law by the Standing Committee of the NPC ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATE : C ONFLICT O VER I NTER-
PRETATION 184 – 192 (Johannes Chan et al. eds., Hong Kong Univ. Press 2000). 
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merely for the record, as with regard to LegCo election procedures subse-
quent to 2007. 142 Yet in many cases, NPCSC approval is a precondition for 
the validity of acts of the HKSAR authorities, and it may inﬂ uence key aspects 
of governance such as the declaration of a state of emergency. 143 In the con-
text of constitutional development, however, it is the NPCSC’s power to 
interpret the Basic Law that has had the most signiﬁ cant repercussions. 
 As set out above, 144 constitutional development in Hong Kong is linked to a 
number of conditions. While the Basic Law delineates a fairly comprehensive 
system of government with a strong executive, a weak legislature, and an inde-
pendent judiciary, it acknowledges that this system is not ﬁ nal, that its  “ ulti-
mate aim ” is the selection of both the chief executive (upon nomination by a 
committee) and LegCo by universal suffrage. 145 Yet the Basic Law does not pro-
vide a clear path to reach this aim. There is no generally understood  “ principle 
of gradual and orderly progress ” in constitutional law, nor is the  “ light of the 
actual situation in Hong Kong ” especially illuminating. 146 The procedural pro-
visions in annex I and II apply only  “ if there is a need ” for change. Yet given 
that the present system is not based on universal suffrage, and that the Basic 
Law sets universal suffrage as the ultimate aim, the need for change is already 
acknowledged, and thus the additional qualiﬁ cations in annex I and II would 
seem superﬂ uous. In the end, the Basic Law leaves ample room for interpreta-
tion, and, as a result, for considerable inﬂ uence of the NPCSC. 
 And the power of interpretation rests exclusively with the NPCSC. Moreover, 
the NPCSC may interpret the Basic Law at its own initiative. 147 Upon authori-
zation by the NPCSC, Hong Kong courts may interpret on their own — in adju-
dicating cases — those provisions of the Basic Law that are  “ within the limits of 
the autonomy of the Region. ” 148 However, in all cases that come within the 
CPG’s purview or bear on the relationship between the CPG and the HKSAR, 
the courts must seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the 
NPCSC before making a ﬁ nal, nonappealable judgment. 149 
 142  See supra note 132 . Another example is  Basic Law art. 90 (appointment of the Chief Justice of 
the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court). 
 143  Basic Law art. 18(4).  See also Basic Law arts. 17(2) and 160 (validity of laws passed by LegCo or 
under British rule) and 18(3) (application of mainland laws to the HSAR). 
 144  See supra notes 111, 131, and accompanying text. 
 145  Basic Law arts. 45(2) and 68(2). 
 146  Id. 
 147  Basic Law art. 158(1). 
 148  Basic Law art. 158(2). 
 149  Basic Law art. 158(3) provides:  “ Only the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) may seek interpretation 
from the NPCSC. If another court passes a judgment that cannot be appealed, it has to seek NPCSC 
interpretation through the CFA. ” 
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 2.2.2.  The Communist Party of China 
 Before analyzing how the NPCSC has made use of its powers, it is important to 
recall some peculiar aspects of Chinese constitutional law: ﬁ rst, there is no sep-
aration of powers in the People’s Republic. 150 While at ﬁ rst sight, the procedure 
for NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law is reminiscent of the preliminary rul-
ings handed down by the European Court of Justice, 151 the NPCSC is a political, 
not a judicial body. Consequently, it has applied a political rather than a legal 
standard to the Basic Law. Second, the Constitution is but a very vague indica-
tion of how decisions are actually taken in the People’s Republic, and by whom. 
Socialist constitutions in general are of a  “ secondary and functional nature. ” 152 
Contrary to Western constitutions, they do not aim to restrict state power and 
protect civil liberties but, mostly, exist only to indicate general policies and are 
but one means among others to further the revolutionary cause. The main 
agent of that cause remains the Communist Party of China (CPC). A separate 
legislative body may well be useful  “ as long as it keeps the right policies and 
direction ” ; however,  “ if the policies are wrong, any kind of legislative body is 
useless. ” 153 
 The CPC appears only in the preamble to the Chinese Constitution, where 
the party’s leadership on the socialist road is stressed. 154 The constitution of 
the CPC, on the other hand, states that  “ the Party commands the overall 
situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters. ” It is the party that has 
to  “ see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the 
state ” fulfill their responsibilities. 155 This supervision is political in nature 
and, therefore, is guided by political considerations. 156 The position of the 
 150  See Deng’s remarks  supra note 72. On the general characteristics of socialist constitutional 
theories, see G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 86. 
 151  Treaty Establishing the European Community, Consolidated Version, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. 
(C 325) 33, art. 234. 
 152  G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 86. 
 153  Deng,  supra note 69, at 75. 
 154  The leadership of the CPC is one of the four basic principles that form the  “ guiding ideology of 
the Constitution. ” . see Peng,  supra note 38, at 398 – 399. The other three are the insistence on 
the socialist road, democratic dictatorship, and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and (most recently) the important thought of Three Represents 
(X IAN F A pmbl, para. 7). For discussion, see A LBERT H.Y. C HEN , A N I NTRODUCTION TO THE L EGAL S YSTEM OF 
THE P EOPLE’S R EPUBLIC OF C HINA 39 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 155  C ONSTITUTION OF THE CPC (A S A MENDED AND A DOPTED AT THE 16 TH N ATIONAL C ONGRESS OF CPC  ON NOV . 14, 
2002), General Program, para. 22,  available at  http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/4446148.
html (last visited April 6, 2007). 
 156  This is also apparent in the selective approach to ﬁ ghting corruption. When Chen Liangyu, 
party chief of Shanghai, was dismissed on charges of mismanagement in September 2006, it was 
generally seen as an attempt to reduce the inﬂ uence of former President Jiang Zemin and his 
so-called  “ Shanghai gang. ”  See Shanghaied , T HE E CONOMIST , Sept. 30, 2006, at 77. 
Langer | The elusive aim of universal suffrage 441
party is further strengthened by the principle of democratic centralism, or 
 “ democracy under centralized guidance. ” 157 This principle allows for subor-
dinate institutions to participate in the formulation of a policy; however, 
once a decision has been taken at the top level, it is binding. It also requires 
the subordination of a lower-level organ to a higher-level organ and of a 
local authority to the central authority. 158 Consequently, when a decision 
has been taken by the highest party echelons, it may not be questioned by 
lower organs, whether they are part of the state or the party structure. This 
also applies to the NPCSC; therefore, its interpretations of law — including 
the Basic Law of the HKSAR — will have to be in line with decisions and 
policies previously adopted by the party leadership. 159 Thus, its interpreta-
tions are of a political, rather than legal, nature, and it is bound to rely, 
inter alia, on  “ Deng Xiaoping Theory ” 160 and its hostility to elections in 
Hong Kong. 161 
 3.  Interpretation of the Basic Law and constitutional 
reform 
 With the return of Hong Kong to China, the Chinese system based on the pri-
macy of the political, on one-party rule, and on democratic centralism has had to 
accommodate an entity governed by the common law with its emphasis on prec-
edent, due process, an independent judiciary, and judicial review. 162 The Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) at ﬁ rst supported the extremely narrow view 
of autonomy advanced by the HKSAR government, namely, that the Hong Kong 
courts could not review any act of the People’s Republic, and that the Central 
Authorities’ competence over Hong Kong was not limited by the Basic Law. 163 
 The CFA later reconsidered its stance in a case on the right of abode. It 
now held that the HKSAR courts had the right, and even the obligation, to 
review any legislative acts of the NPC or the NPCSC for consistency with the 
 157  X IAN F A art. 3; C ONSTITUTION OF THE CPC, General Program, para. 21 and art. 10. 
 158  For a more detailed account, see G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 99. 
 159  The principle of democratic centralism also applies to interpretations by the NPCSC.  See Wen, 
 supra note 141, at 193. 
 160  See supra note 154. 
 161  See supra notes 69 – 75. 
 162  On the impact of the common law on Hong Kong, see B ERRY F. C. H SU , T HE C OMMON L AW IN C HINESE 
C ONTEXT (Hong Kong Univ. Press 1992). On the number of judicial review cases decided by Hong 
Kong courts, see Tai,  supra note 96, at 54. 
 163  Yash Ghai,  Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Procedure ,  in H ONG K ONG’S 
C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATE ,  supra note 141, at 7 and 16. The case under consideration was HKSAR 
v. Ma Wai Kwan David [1997] H.K.L.R.D 761 (on the legality of the Provisional LegCo). 
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Basic Law, and to strike them down if necessary. 164 The CFA also claimed that 
it was for it alone to decide whether, in adjudicating a case, an interpretation 
had to be sought from the NPCSC under art. 158(3) of the Basic Law. 165 This 
muscular approach soon led to strong criticism by the Central Authorities, 
with mainland legal scholars as its vanguard. 166 They claimed that by exer-
cising constitutional jurisdiction, the CFA had tried to assume  “ the nature of 
a sovereign power, ” extending  “ its jurisdiction to Beijing. ” Such an approach 
was  “ ridiculous, ” as China was a unitary country; sovereignty, the scholars 
maintained, was inalienable and could only be exercised by the CPG. 167 
 The mainland response showed little understanding of the common law 
system, in general, and of the principle of judicial independence, in particu-
lar. 168 Instead, the mainland scholars insisted that the Chinese constitutional 
approach, as set out above, should apply to Hong Kong as well. The main sup-
porter of this approach in Hong Kong was, somewhat paradoxically, the chief 
executive of the HKSAR. He decided to seek an interpretation of the Basic Law 
provision on the right of abode, even though the Basic Law only provides for 
referral to the NPCSC by way of the CFA. 169 Nevertheless, the chief executive 
 “ suggested ” an interpretation by the NPCSC. 170 In doing so, he relied on 
article 158(1) of the Basic Law and article 67(4) of the Chinese Constitution, 
thus suggesting that the Basic Law has to be interpreted within the frame-
work of the Constitution, or that the Constitution may, in fact, apply directly 
to the HKSAR. 171 With his claim that interpretation could be sought  “ before, 
during or after a case, ” the chief executive undermined the CFA’s right to ﬁ nal 
 164  Ghai,  supra note 163, at 17. In Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D 315, 
the CFA considered interpretation of  Basic Law arts. 22(4) and 24(2)(3). The latter states that 
persons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong but to permanent HKSAR residents shall 
also be entitled to permanent residency. The Hong Kong government relied on an Ordinance 
passed by the Provisional LegCo to require an exit permit by  mainland authorities before permanent 
residency could be granted. The ordinance was found unconstitutional by the court and severed. 
 165  Ng Ka Ling at para. 99. 
 166  Xiao Weiyun et al.,  Why the Court of Final Appeal Was Wrong ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL 
D EBATE ,  supra note 141, at 53 – 59. 
 167  Id. , at 55. 
 168  For a rebuttal see Johannes M. M. Chen,  Judicial Independence ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL 
D EBATE ,  supra note 141, at 61 – 71. 
 169  Basic Law art. 158(3),  supra note 149 . The government invoked  Basic Law arts. 43 and 48(2), 
which deal with the  implementation of the Basic Law, not its interpretation. 
 170  Yash Ghai,  The NPC Interpretation and Its Consequences ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATE , 
 supra note 141, at 202. 
 171  Even mainland scholars point out that  Basic Law art. 158 is an autonomous provision inde-
pendent of X IAN F A art. 67(4), and that the NPCSC should not rely on the Constitution to interpret 
the Basic Law.  See Wen,  supra note 141, at 193. 
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adjudication and established the NPCSC as an additional instance. On June 
26, 1999, the NPCSC passed an interpretation of the Basic Law that restricted 
the right of abode and admonished Hong Kong courts to  “ adhere to this 
interpretation. ” 172 
 The chief executive had invoked the NPCSC in pursuance of a speciﬁ c pol-
icy issue, not realizing that he set a precedent for interference in other mat-
ters, one which would allow the NPCSC to intervene on its own accord. 
Indeed, the Standing Committee soon concerned itself with an issue related 
to the chief executive himself. Tung Chee-hwa had been selected as the ﬁ rst 
chief executive in 1997. 173 Because he left ofﬁ ce after serving only three 
years of his second ﬁ ve-year term, 174 it was not clear whether his successor 
would ﬁ nish Tung’s term or be elected for a full ﬁ ve-year term. 175 
Subsequently, the NPCSC, again at the Hong Kong government’s request, 
ruled that a new chief executive would serve only the remainder of Tung’s 
second term. 176 Therefore, new chief executive David Tsang faced reelection 
in 2007 and thus had to tread very carefully to secure support and reap-
pointment by the CPG. 
 Another side effect of the 2003 protests, which eventually led to Tung’s res-
ignation, had been the establishment, in early 2004, of a task force on consti-
tutional development. 177 It published its ﬁ rst report in March 2004, examining 
mainly procedural issues. 178 The report conﬁ rmed that, in the view of the 
Central Authorities, constitutional development was an issue that affected the 
relationship between the HKSAR and the CPG, and that the latter would, 
 172  Interpretation by the NPCSC of arts. 22(4) and 24(2) and (3) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, 
June 26, 1999,  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm . For an account 
of events see Ghai,  supra note 170, at 199 – 215. 
 173  The selection procedure was based on the Decision of the National People’s Congress on the 
Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the HKSAR, 
April 4, 1990.  Cf. Basic Law Annex I(6). 
 174  See supra note 114. 
 175  Basic Law art. 52(1). 
 176  Interpretation by the NPCSC of Paragraph 2, Article 53 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, Apr. 27, 
2005,  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/article1.pdf . 
 177  Tung Chee-hwa,  The 2004 Policy Address: Seizing Opportunities for Development  – Promoting 
People-based Government , para. 77 – 78, Jan. 7, 2004,  available at  http://www.policyaddress.gov.
hk/pa04/eng/pdf/speech.pdf . 
 178  C ONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT T ASK F ORCE (First Report), I SSUES OF L EGISLATIVE P ROCESS IN THE B ASIC L AW 
R ELATING TO C ONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT (March 2004),  available at  http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/
eng/report/index.htm . For an assessment, see Johannes Chan & Lison Harris,  The Constitutional 
Journey: The Way Forward ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATES ,  supra note 64, at 145 – 147. 
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therefore, have a say in it. 179 Yet the report also concluded that article 159 of 
the Basic Law need not be invoked when changing the selection procedures 
stipulated in annexes I and II of the Basic Law. 180 Therefore, no NPC approval 
would be required. 181 The task force also set out the competence to initiate 
amendments to annexes I and II once there was a need for such amendments; 182 
however, it did not pronounce on who was to decide whether or when such a 
need existed. 
 It was this lacuna that the NPCSC, of its own accord, decided to ﬁ ll with yet 
another interpretation based on Basic Law article 158(1) and, again, on article 
67(4) of the Chinese Constitution. 183 First, the NPCSC ruled that, despite the 
ultimate aim of universal suffrage, there might, in fact, not be any need for 
amendments in or after 2007. 184 The chief executive was asked to submit a 
report on the matter, yet the sole authority to decide whether there was a need 
for amendment or not would lay with the NPCSC, which would take its decision 
in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong and with a view to gradual and 
orderly progress. If, then, such a decision were taken, only the HKSAR execu-
tive would be allowed to introduce the relevant motions into LegCo. 185 Thus, 
the NPCSC has the power to stiﬂ e any proposals by simply denying the need for 
change; if, however, such a need is acknowledged, the HKSAR executive —
 rather than a more independently minded LegCo — would formulate the rele-
vant proposals. For LegCo, the only way of inﬂ uencing such proposals would be 
to block amendments by denying them the required two-thirds majority. 
 The chief executive duly submitted the requested report on April 15, 2004. 186 
In principle, Tung Chee-hwa acknowledged the need for amendment, yet at the 
same time qualiﬁ ed any amendment to be made. Instead of the two principles 
stated in the Basic Law — gradual and orderly progress and the actual situation 
in Hong Kong — the report lists nine factors with which any amendment must 
 179  I SSUES OF L EGISLATIVE P ROCESS ,  supra note 178, at para. 1.5.  See also supra note 149 and accompany-
ing text. 
 180  I SSUES OF L EGISLATIVE P ROCESS ,  supra note 177, at para. 3.8. 
 181  See supra notes 132, 136 and accompanying text. Under Annex II, amendments to the election 
method of LegCo have to be reported to the NPC for the record only, whereas amendments under 
art. 159 require NPC approval. 
 182  Such need is explicitly required by Annexes I and II.  See supra notes 111 and 132 . 
 183  The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the NPC of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III 
of Annex II to the Basic Law, April 6, 2004,  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/
fulltext/0406npcsc_e.pdf . 
 184  Id. at para. 2. 
 185  Id. at para. 3. 
 186  Tung Chee-hwa,  Report on Whether There Is a Need to Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in 2008 , April 
16, 2004,  available at  http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/executive/pdf/cereport.pdf . 
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comply. 187 These  “ factors, ” to some extent, state conditions that are to be found 
neither in the Basic Law nor in its interpretation by the NPCSC. According to 
the report, the HKSAR, when examining any constitutional change, would, 
ﬁ rst and foremost, have to  “ pay heed to the views of the Central Authorities. ” 188 
Yet while the NPC would certainly have the last — and, after the interpretation 
of April 6, 2004 (see note 183), also the ﬁ rst — word on amendments, there was 
no need to grant it a veto during the discussion of amendments as well. 189 The 
report also claimed that  “ any proposed amendment must aim at consolidating 
the executive-led system headed by the Chief Executive ” 190 — again, there is no 
basis for such a requirement in the Basic Law. Nor does the Basic Law stipulate 
that constitutional development is conditional upon  “ public awareness on 
political participation, the maturity of political talent and political groups. ” 191 
Thus, while basically acknowledging a need for change, the report added so 
many conditions that any change would be marginal at best. These conditions 
advocate the preservation of functional constituencies, favor the executive 
branch, and display a general suspicion of direct elections. 192 
 The interpretation of April 6 and the chief executive’s report had already nar-
rowed the scope for constitutional changes considerably. Yet based on the report, 
the NPCSC promulgated a decision on April 26, 2004, that effectively barred any 
substantial changes, ruling that  “ in the circumstances, conditions do not exist 
for the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by 
a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures, ” nor for the election of all LegCo members by universal suffrage. 193 
 187  For discussion, see Benny Tai Yiu-ting,  One Principle … Two Principles … 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Factors 
for Constitutional Reform ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATES ,  supra note 125, at 15 – 27. The vice 
chairman of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC had already added the principle of 
 “ balanced representation. ”  See Explanations on Interpretations of Clause 7 of Annex I and Clause 3 of 
Annex II to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC by the NPCSC (Draft) , P EOPLE’S D AILY , April 2, 2004, 
 available at  http://english.people.com.cn/200404/06/eng20040406_139608.shtml . 
 188  Tung Chee-hwa,  supra note 186, at 4 para. (i). 
 189  T AI ,  supra note 187, at 20. 
 190  Tung Chee-hwa,  supra note 186, at 4 para. (iv). 
 191  Id. , at 4 para. (vi). 
 192  Johannes Chan & Lison Harris,  The Constitutional Journey: The Way Forward ,  in H ONG K ONG’S 
C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATES ,  supra note 64, at 149. Proponents of indirect elections repeatedly cited the 
operation of the Electoral College in US presidential elections as a widely accepted example of indi-
rect elections.  See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,  “ One Person, One Vote ” : The US 
Electoral System and the Functional Constituencies, in F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES ,  supra note 13, at 313. 
For a discussion (and refutation) of this comparison see F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES at 314 – 320. 
 193  Decision of the Standing Committee of the NPC on issues relating to the Methods for selecting 
the Chief Executive of the HKSAR in the Year 2007 and for forming the Legislative Council of the 
HKSAR in the Year 2008, April 26, 2004,  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/
0426npcsc_e.pdf . 
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Consequently, neither the chief executive in 2007 nor LegCo in 2008 should be 
selected by this means. In addition, the proportion of members elected by func-
tional constituencies versus direct elections was also to remain the same. 194  This 
decision ruled out any signiﬁ cant change in 2007 – 8. It was not surprising, then, 
that the subsequent reports of the task force were mainly concerned with justify-
ing the political decision of the NPCSC — legal arguments are notably absent. 
Instead, the government tried to come up with some suggestions regarding the 
few issues that had not been precluded by the NPCSC decision, such as the size of 
the Election Committee and the overall number of LegCo members. 195 
 Eventually, a ﬁ fth report put forward the proposals that were introduced to 
LegCo on December 21, 2005. 196 First, all district councillors should be included 
in the Election Committee and the number of its members be increased to 
1,600; 197 second, starting in 2008, LegCo would consist of seventy instead of 
sixty members, yet still with one half selected by functional constituencies and 
the other half returned by geographical constituencies. 198 These proposals 
were hailed as substantial and sensible by the government and by pro-China 
politicians, who maintained that the inclusion of the district councillors in the 
Election Committee would add a signiﬁ cant democratic element. 199 The demo-
cratic camp, on the other hand, denounced the proposals as insufﬁ cient and 
 194  Id. at E9. 
 195  C ONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT T ASK F ORCE (Third Report), A REAS w HICH MAY BE C ONSIDERED FOR A MEND-
MENT IN RESPECT OF THE M ETHODS FOR S ELECTING THE C HIEF E XECUTIVE IN 2007  AND F ORMING THE L EGISLATIVE 
C OUNCIL IN 2008 (May 2004),  available at  http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/report3/pdf/thirdreport.
pdf . 
 196  C ONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT T ASK F ORCE (Fifth Report), P ACKAGE OF P ROPOSALS FOR THE M ETHODS FOR 
S ELECTING THE C HIEF E XECUTIVE IN 2007  AND FOR F ORMING THE L EGISLATIVE C OUNCIL IN 2008 (October 2005), 
 available at  http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/report5/pdf/5th_Report_English.pdf 
 197  (Draft) Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the HKSAR Regarding the Method for the Selec-
tion of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR ,  id. , at Annex B. There are eighteen District Councils with 
very limited communal powers, comprising 529 councillors, 102 of which are appointed by the 
government. 
 198  (Draft) Amendment to Annex II to the Basic Law of the HKSAR Regarding the Method for the Forma-
tion of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR and its Voting Procedures, id. , at Annex C. 
 199  Press Release, Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Government’s Proposed 07/08 Electoral Package 
Best Way Forward for Democratic Development (Dec. 14, 2005),  available at  http://www.cab.gov.
hk/cd/eng/media/p121405.htm ; Press Release, Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Government’s 
Proposed Package on 2007/08 Elections Surely Not step Backward in Democratic Development 
(Dec. 18, 2005),  available at  http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/media/p121805.htm . However, it 
has to be kept in mind that appointed district councillors were reintroduced in 1997.  See supra 
notes 93 and 197 . Also, the Government has ruled out abolishing appointed district councillors 
before 2012.  See Press Release, Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Government’s Proposal of Abolish-
ing Appointed District Council Seats in 2012 at the Earliest (Dec. 19, 2005),  available at  http://
www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/media/p121905.htm 
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pointed, in particular, to the absence of a timetable for introducing universal 
suffrage. 200 In its ﬁ nal report, the task force had stated that  “ on the issue of set-
ting a timetable for introducing universal suffrage, the task force notes that 
there are still divergent views within the community ” ; therefore, different sec-
tors of the community would have to  “ continue to work together to help to 
create favorable conditions for attaining universal suffrage. ” Such conditions 
would include  “ grooming political talents, and promoting the long-term stabil-
ity and prosperity of Hong Kong. ” 201 At this stage, implementing the proposals 
of the task force  “ would be an important step towards the ultimate aim of uni-
versal suffrage. ” 202 Any further democratization, and particularly the intro-
duction of universal suffrage in 2007 – 8, would be impossible, seeing that it 
was barred by the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPCSC) of April 26, 2004. 203 
 During the LegCo meeting held on December 21, 2005, the government 
made two motions based on the two proposals put forward by the task force. 204 
Both motions were supported by a majority of thirty-four members, with twenty-
four rejecting the proposals and one member abstaining. However, both motions 
concerned an amendment to the Basic Law and, therefore, required a two-thirds 
majority of the LegCo. 205 Thus, the government suffered an unprecedented 
defeat, notwithstanding its intensive lobbying efforts during the previous 
night. 206 Meanwhile, the democrats’ tactics, which involved cutting the debate 
short — thus avoiding further lobbying pressure on individual LegCo mem-
bers — had led to a rare victory. 207 In the aftermath of the decision, Chief 
Executive Tsang maintained that the proposals had, in fact, gained the support 
of the majority of Hong Kongers, hinting darkly that  “ what has happened on 
the 21st ” is bound to affect Hong Kong’s relationship with the CPG, which had 
 200  Dikky Sinn,  Lawmakers Urge Rethink in Wake of Protest Turnout , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Dec. 
5, 2005. Chris Yeung et al.,  We Have Not Offered Timetable, Says Beijing , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Dec. 8, 2005. 
 201  C ONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT T ASK F ORCE (Fifth Report),  supra note 196, at paras. 5(25) and (27). 
 202  Id. , at para. 5(25). 
 203  Id. , at para. 5(24). 
 204  LegCo, Minutes of the Meeting Held on Wednesday 21 December 2005 at 11:00 a.m., LC Paper 
No. CB(3) 253/05 – 06, at 133 – 136. 
 205  Basic Law art. 159(2). 
 206  Dikky Sinn,  No Way I Will Accept, Says Tsang’s Friend Albert Cheng , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Dec. 22, 2005; Ambrose Leung,  Mandy Tam’s Not a Lady for Turning , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Dec. 22, 2005. 
 207  Jimmy Cheung,  Democrats’ Silence Catches the Opposition Off Guard , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Dec. 22, 2005; Dikky Sinn,  Vigil Becomes a Victory Celebration , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Dec. 22, 
2005. 
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traditionally been  “ very accommodating and very selﬂ ess in what it has done ” 
for Hong Kong. 208 Indeed, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Ofﬁ ce under 
China’s State Council stated that the vote had not been  “ in line with the main-
stream ” of public opinion in Hong Kong and that the CPG was  “ unwilling to 
see ” the result. 209 An NPCSC member stated that the democratic parties  “ should 
be held responsible for halting Hong Kong’s democratic development. ” 210 
 The vote on December 21 represented the only juncture at which LegCo 
could have its say on the government proposals; thus, in order not to be side-
lined for the foreseeable future, the prodemocracy forces decided to block the 
motions. 211 Yet this will also mean that, in accordance with the NPCSC’s inter-
pretation of April 6, 2004, 212 the election of the chief executive in 2007 and of 
LegCo in 2008 will not entail progress toward the aim of universal suffrage. 
Instead, the tortuous process of selecting an Election Committee for the chief 
executive was carried out once more. 213 As a feature of this procedure, the 796 
members of the committee were entitled to nominate candidates, with each 
candidate having to secure at least one hundred nominations. 214 In contrast to 
the 2005 election, two candidates were standing for the chief executive elec-
tions on March 25, 2007. 215 For the ﬁ rst time, a televised debate between the 
candidates was held. 216 But, in the end, the election outcome was predeter-
mined by the CPG, which has to appoint any chief executive – elect 217 — and, as 
 208  Press Release,  Transcript of the Media Session by the Chief Executive, Mr Donald Tsang, on the First 
Day of His Duty Visit to Beijing (Dec. 28, 2005),  available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/ce/eng/
p200506-12.htm . 
 209  China Criticises HK Lawmakers’ Rejections of Gradual Democratic Reforms , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING 
P OST , Dec. 22, 2005. 
 210  Hong Kong Democracy Suffers Setback , P EOPLE’S D AILY , Dec. 23, 2005. 
 211  Jimmy Cheung,  Fears of Blank Cheque on Electoral Reform , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Oct. 18, 
2005. 
 212  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 213  For the complicated composition of the Election Committee, see Chief Executive Election Ordi-
nance, (2001) Cap. 569, Schedule Part 2 (H.K.). 
 214  Thus, the Election Committee not only selects the chief executive but also the candidates for the 
post: Chief Executive Ordinance, (2001) Cap. 569, § 16. 
 215  LegCo Member Alan Leong Kah-kit (Civic Party) secured 132 nominations by members of the 
Election Committee, compared to 641 for Donald Tsang.  See Ambrose Leung & Albert Wong,  Tsang 
Takes His Place in Race he Cannot Lose , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Feb. 17, 2007. 
 216  Members of the public were not allowed to attend the debate, which took place before the Elec-
tion Committee. Yet the supposedly apolitical Hong Kongers watched it in record numbers on tel-
evision.  See Daap mahn daaih wuis sau sih sing keijap, yu 207 man yahn sau hon [Debate Draws Bigger 
Audience Than Soap-Operas, Over 2,070,000 viewers] , M ING P AO , Mar. 4, 2007. 
 217  Dikky Sinn,  Pro-Democracy Camp Fields Long-Shot Candidate in Leader Race , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING 
P OST , Nov. 6, 2006. 
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senior members of the Central Government had already made clear, a chief 
executive from the opposition was out of question. 218 
 The incumbent Donald Tsang was duly reelected by 649 out of 789 votes 
cast. 219 In his election manifesto, he had promised to  “ pragmatically seek to 
achieve a consensus within [Hong Kong] society on the model for universal 
suffrage ” 220 within his ﬁ ve-year term, and to implement reforms that would 
allow the political system  “ to move towards democratization. ” 221 He did not 
give any details if, or what, changes to the constitutional arrangement would 
be considered, or whether he envisaged universal suffrage by 2012 or 2017. 222 
Instead, he promised to revive the colonial practice of publishing a green paper 
on constitutional development and then allowing three months of public con-
sultation. Afterward, he would  “ frankly report mainstream views and differing 
opinions to the Central Government, ” which would thus be helped  “ to under-
stand the thoughts and wishes of the Hong Kong people. ” 223 Given their previ-
ous experience with such consultations under British rule, 224 it is unlikely that 
Hong Kongers will be holding their breath. 
 4.  Ultimate aim — or unattainable goal? 
 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty should be 
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning given 
to its terms, in context, and in light of the document’s object and purpose. 225 
The Joint Declaration provides for the selection of the chief executive through 
elections or consultations and for LegCo to be elected as well. It also provides 
for a  “ high degree of autonomy. ” 226 That the term  “ elections ” carried the gen-
erally accepted meaning of democratic elections through universal suffrage 
and based on the principle  “ one person – one vote ” was conﬁ rmed by the Basic 
Law, which implemented the Declaration that explicitly sets the ultimate aim 
of universal suffrage. And autonomy, in its true sense, would entail vesting the 
 218  Jimmy Cheung,  No Way Opposition Can Win, State Leader Tells Leong , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , 
Feb. 7, 2007. 
 219  Alan Leong obtained 123 votes, nine less than for his nomination. Jimmy Cheung,  Tsang wins 
with 649 votes , SCMP, Mar. 25, 2007. 
 220  D ONALD T SANG , E LECTION P LATFORM P OLICY B LUEPRINT 19 (Donald Tsang Election Ofﬁ ce, Hong Kong 
2007). 
 221  Id. , at 20. 
 222  Margaret Ng,  You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide From Democracy , S OUTH C HINA M ORNING P OST , Feb. 9, 
2007. 
 223  T SANG ,  supra note 220, at 20. 
 224  See supra note 66. 
 225  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. 
 226  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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power of legislation and interpretation, at least to some extent, in the HKSAR. 
Under the principle of  “ one country, two systems, ” Hong Kong is not only to 
enjoy an economic and social system different from the mainland but also a 
separate constitutional setting. 227 To this end, article 31 of the Chinese 
Constitution provides for Special Administrative Regions; however, if Hong 
Kong is to be truly autonomous, this would also require the creation of a  “ spe-
cial constitutional zone, ” as it were, to be ﬁ lled exclusively by the Basic Law, at 
least so far as aspects of the  “ two systems ” are concerned. On the other hand, 
the HKSAR government and the NPCSC have, in the context of interpretation, 
repeatedly relied on the Chinese Constitution, thus arguing for its application 
to the HKSAR. 228 Yet applying the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, for 
unrestricted power of the NPC, would make nonsense of Hong Kong’s 
autonomy. 229 
 With the ultimate constitutional aim clearly delineated, the criteria of 
 “ gradual and orderly progress ” and the  “ actual situation in Hong Kong ” 
become central. 230 The Basic Law comes with an expiry date, thus setting a 
time limit for the achievement of universal suffrage: the law is valid for ﬁ fty 
years — until 2047, 231 by which time, at the latest, both LegCo and the chief 
executive must be elected by universal suffrage. So far, progress has been not 
merely gradual but negligible. Since an electoral element was ﬁ rst introduced 
to LegCo in 1985, democratic elements have been added in a very cautious 
manner, frequently taking two steps back after advancing one step — most 
notably with the Provisional LegCo in 1997. 232 With regard to the  “ actual situ-
ation in Hong Kong, ” the NPCSC’s assumption that Hong Kong still lacks the 
experience necessary to practice democratic elections 233 can be made indeﬁ -
nitely, as long as democratic elections are not held. It is difﬁ cult to see how the 
NPCSC, as an appointed body in a communist system, should be ideally suited 
to pronounce on matters of universal suffrage. In addition, the LegCo elections 
in 2004 saw a vigorous political culture that would do honor to many mature 
democracies. 
 Responsibility for the slow progress lies, ﬁ rst and foremost, with the Central 
Authorities. In 1985, Deng had stated that Hong Kong had to be governed by 
 227  In fact, the capitalist economic system would be irreconcilable with the constitutional system as 
prescribed by the Chinese Constitution. 
 228  See supra notes 169, 183, and accompanying text. 
 229  On the relationship between the Basic Law and the Constitution, see Yash Ghai,  The Imperatives 
of Autonomy: Contradictions of the Basic Law ,  in H ONG K ONG’S C ONSTITUTIONAL D EBATES ,  supra note 64, at 
34 – 35, and G HAI ,  supra note 13, at 178. 
 230  See supra notes 110 and 131 and accompanying text. 
 231  Joint Declaration art. 3(12). 
 232  See supra note 96. 
 233  NPCSC Decision of April 26, 2004,  supra note 193, at E7. 
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patriots, and that elections  “ would not necessarily bring out people like that. ” 234 
Today’s leaders of China still very much stand by that position, as the reemer-
gence of Deng in 2004 and the restrictive interpretation of Hong Kong auton-
omy by the NPSCS have shown. 235 
 Yet the instrument of interpretation was ﬁ rst invoked not by the CPG but by 
the government of the HKSAR. 236 So far, its executive has shown little inclina-
tion to lead the HKSAR to universal suffrage. True, under the current constitu-
tional structure, its allegiances are likely to be to the CPG rather than to a 
powerless electorate in Hong Kong. 237 Yet its subservience to the Central 
Authorities has considerably slowed constitutional progress by adding addi-
tional conditions for democratization. 238 It is not particularly ambitious for 
sixty-two-year-old Chief Executive Tsang to state, as he has done, that he hopes 
to see universal suffrage in Hong Kong in his lifetime. 239 In some respects, Hong 
Kong might be reminded of its colonial days, for it is saddled with an appointed 
administration that is neither truly elected by nor responsible to the people of 
Hong Kong. Moreover, it is an administration that, under the guise of protect-
ing stability and prosperity, is more intent on pursuing the agenda of the met-
ropolitan power than on safeguarding the interests of Hong Kong. 
 The HKSAR government also matches its colonial predecessor in benign 
paternalism. It seems to doubt that Hong Kong citizens are able to understand 
the concept of  “ one country, two systems, ” or that their  “ public awareness on 
political participation ” is sufﬁ ciently high to warrant universal suffrage. 240 
This skepticism regarding the capability of the governed to have a say in gov-
ernment has a long tradition in modern Chinese political thinking. At the out-
set of the twentieth century, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had already argued that a 
government had to impose order during a period of  “ tutelage. ” Once the people 
had learned enough about self-government, they would be given the freedom 
in practice to which they were entitled in principle. 241 Similarly, Deng had 
argued that  “ because we have one billion people, and their educational level is 
 234  See supra note 73. 
 235  See supra notes 127, 184, and 193. 
 236  See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 237  See supra note 109. Nominally, the Chief Executive is accountable to both the CPG and LegCo 
( Basic Law art. 43(2)). 
 238  See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 239  Press Release, CE Speaks to Media After the Public Rally (1) (Dec. 4, 2005),  available at  http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200512/04/P200512040248.htm . 
 240  Tung Chee-wha,  supra note 186, at 5 – 6. 
 241  Andrew J. Nathan,  Redeﬁ nitions of Freedom in China ,  in T HE I DEA OF F REEDOM IN A SIA AND A FRICA 255 
(Robert H. Taylor, ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2002); H SÜ ,  supra note 7, at 463. 
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not very high, conditions are not yet ripe for direct elections ” in China. 242 
Donald Tsang followed this tradition in his 2006 – 7 policy address when he 
stated that  “ to prepare for democratic government, Hong Kong needs to 
encourage quality people to pursue a political career. ” To this end, the govern-
ment would promote national and civic education and would  “ provide more 
channels for those who aspire to a political career in the Administration. ” 243 
Apart from such musings on a period of  “ tutelage, ” constitutional develop-
ment was largely absent from the chief executive’s policy address. Instead, he 
chose to impress on Hong Kongers the importance of promoting  “ social har-
mony. ” 244 It so happened that social harmony had also been the focus of the 
sixth plenary session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which had opened three days before the chief executive 
delivered his policy address. 245 It does, indeed, appear as if Hong Kong has 
entered a new phase of  “ convergence. ” 246 
 242  Deng,  supra note 69, at 76. 
 243  Donald Tsang, The 2006 – 07 Policy Address: Proactive, Pragmatic, Always People First (Oct. 
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